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Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Redistribution: The Case of the Indian Panchayats 
Shirin M. Rai 
 
By examining evidence from India, where quotas for women in local government were 
introduced in 1993, this article argues that institutional reform can disturb hegemonic 
discourses sufficiently to open a window of opportunity where deliberative democratic norms 
take root and where, in addition to the politics of recognition, the politics of redistribution also 
operates. 
 
Feminists have long struggled with issues that arise out of participation in institutional politics. 
On the one hand, not participating in institutional politics raises the fear of marginalization. On 
the other hand, while there is the allure of influence there is also the fear of co-option 
(Watson,1989; Rai and Lievesley 1996; Randall and Waylen 1998). In general, the 1990s saw 
the resolution of this dilemma in most country contexts in favor of feminist participation in 
institutional politics. This did not mean that the issues of co-option and marginalization 
disappeared. However, the focus shifted to assessing and reviewing the terms of participation in 
and the outcomes of such involvement in institutional politics. Also at this time, liberal 
democratic theory began to grapple with issues that arose from group rather than individual 
claims to rights and citizenship (Kymlicka 1995; Young 1995; Phillips 1995). Because of these 
shifts, parliaments, local governments, and bureaucracies renewed their focus on increasing the 
rates and levels of women’s participation (Goetz 1997; Karam 1998; Rai 2000), and used quotas 
as one of several strategies to do so (Dahlerup 2006). However, Nancy Fraser has argued that 
quotas reflect a “politics of recognition.” Fraser suggests that identity politics allows for 
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recognition of inequalities within society but that we also need to ask whether such recognition 
leads to the “politics of redistribution” (Fraser, 1995).  
In this article, I build on these discussions, to examine the process of participation by 
assessing whether deliberative politics, together with enhanced levels of women’s presence, can 
help transform institutions in order to bring about efficient, less corrupt, and more gender-
sensitive outcomes. The starting point of the deliberative democratic framework seems to be that 
“democracy revolves around the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of 
preferences” (Elster 1997, 1). I recognize that institutional processes themselves are embedded in 
structures of social power, which limit the effectiveness of the outcomes of deliberation. The 
voices of the marginalized and the deprived continue to be ignored within the context of 
economic and social inequalities. However, if we are not to write off institutional politics 
entirely, then we must force political institutions to work in a more open and deliberative way to 
deliver a gender-sensitive political equality agenda. At the same time, if we are to sustain the 
long-term legitimacy of institutional politics, then we must look also to a “politics of 
redistribution” that enhances the quality of deliberation.  
I make my case by examining the quota system introduced in India in 1993, which 
ensured that women constituted 33 percent of the membership and leadership of village councils 
(panchayats) and urban local bodies. I suggest that a focus on deliberative democracy allows us 
to do several things. First, we can make judgments about the processes in which women are 
being asked to participate, which is important to sustaining women’s participation in the face of a 
lack recognition of their efforts or as a result of an experience of the political process as 
threatening to their security or well being. Second, it raises questions about the appropriateness 
of the current parameters of the political party system within which the panchayats function. 
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Third, a focus on deliberative democracy allows us to examine whether the “politics of presence” 
or recognition rather than of outcome or redistribution should therefore be the limit of our 
expectations. Finally, it allows us to reflect upon the ever-present political problem of structure 
and agency—how deliberation can take place among political actors within boundaries of 
socioeconomic structures that are reflective of fundamental, and some would argue, increasing 
social inequality between men and women.  
State institutions are gendered spaces that also reflect the socioeconomic inequalities of 
class and caste.<1> Within these socially embedded institutions the politics of presence and the 
politics of ideas do not always coincide leading to the undermining of deliberative processes. 
However, secondary and primary empirical data leads me to argue that there is value in 
strengthening deliberative processes in the panchayats. This is because women panchas show, 
within the constraints mentioned above, a growing self-confidence through participation in local 
politics that paying attention the processes of deliberation within local government institutions 
could further enhance. A strengthened deliberative process might then produce improved 
outcomes for village development. This study demonstrates that institutional reform can disturb 
hegemonic discourses and the politics of presence sufficiently to prepare the soil in which 
deliberative democratic norms might be able to take root. The deliberative model gives us a 
framework for holding these bodies more accountable and ensuring that participants in its 
processes can do so with confidence, thus perhaps disturbing some identity-based power 





The Panchayati Raj System  
Historically, panchayats (village councils) in India were local, deliberative bodies. An ideal 
panchayat reflected the presence of “difference” within its boundaries, marking different 
religions, castes, and classes and insisting upon a working process by which difficult issues were 
deliberated and decisions arrived at that transcended the particular interests of the panchas 
(panchayat members). Munshi Prem Chand’s short story “Panch Parmeshwar” movingly and 
memorably illustrates how a person is transformed by being elected to serve on the panchayat 
and how the responsibility that comes with being a panch (councilor) works its magic to 
overcome prejudice and conflict in favor of justice (1996, 85-95). The title of the story is deeply 
evocative of respect that traditionally accrued to the village panch: parmeshwar is a synonym for 
“god.” Deliberative theorists would love this story—it speaks directly to the transformation of 
interests as an outcome of deliberation within political institutions.  
At the time of India’s independence, Gandhi insisted that the concept of village self-
sufficiency (gram swaraj) be translated into village self-governance (panchayati raj). The 
promise of decentralized state authority legitimized the new democratic state while at the same 
time keeping village institutions within the state framework. As a result, Article 40(C) of the 
Indian constitution provided that “the state should take steps to organise village Panchayats and 
endow them with such power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as 
units of self-government” (Kaushik 1993, 20). The process of opening, providing resources for, 
and democratizing these bodies has continued ever since. The Community Development and 
Panchayati Raj system was established in 1959, taking into account the recommendations of the 
Balwant Rai Mehta Committee Report of 1957. By 1962, the Panchayati Raj system became 
nationally visible (Kaushik, 1993). While in the states some experiments with quotas had already 
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started as early as the 1980s in 1993, the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution addressed 
the questions of strengthening the role of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) nationwide. The 
73rd amendment introduced direct election to and five-year terms for all seats of the panchayats 
at all three levels. The elections of the chairpersons of Block Samiti and Zila Parishads were to 
be indirect, with the mode of election at the village panchayat level left to the states to 
decide.<3> The amendments also introduced one of the most far-reaching measures for local 
democracy—a quota of 33 percent for women, which would induct over 79,500 women into 
politics. Quotas can be seen as part of the deliberative democracy framework by recognizing that 
equality of opportunity and access to resources requires at times that individuals and groups be 
treated unequally where they are disadvantaged due to circumstances beyond their control 
(Roemer 1993, 1995). This acceptance of inequality to rectify historical exclusions, however, is 
not reflected in two areas critical to the functioning of the panchayats. First, the political party 
system in India, which is deeply entrenched and increasingly reflective of identity politics, and 
second, class inequities reflected in land ownership and labor relations that undermine the 
political equality that is the basis of Indian quota legislation.  
Next, I will consider the merits of the deliberative democracy framework in order to 
assess whether this framework is suited to local governance in light of the experience of the 
panchayati raj system in India. I will do this by considering arguments for quotas for women in 
Indian local government and the social and political challenges faced by women who have 
entered PRI politics in the delivery of effective governance.  
 
Deliberative Democracy Framework: Process, Outcome, and Context 
Comment [SR6]: This is first mention?  
Comment [HLM7]: ? If this is a 
common acronym, we should insert it in 
parentheses at first incidence of that term.  
Formatted: Font: Italic
Comment [HLM8]: Define for our 
readers unfamiliar with these terms? 
Comment [ARR9]: Have outlined this is 
end note 3? 
Comment [HLM10]: OK to lowercase? 
Are these general terms? Italics? 
 6 
Deliberation has been an important part of democratic or consultative decision making in various 
contexts and locations over time. In the Indian context, panchayats deliberated in order to come 
to consensual decisions. Deliberative democratic theory focuses on three elements: process, 
outcome, and context. As a process, deliberation includes a number of actions: (1) collective 
decision making with participation by all who will be affected by the decision or their 
representatives; (2) decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who 
are committed to the values of “rationality and impartiality” such that they are able to argue in 
terms of public rather than simply particular interests; (3) conversing so that individuals speak 
and listen sequentially before making collective decisions; (4) ensuring that the interests of 
certain participants are not privileged over those of others and that no individual or group can 
dictate the outcome of others’ actions, which means that outcomes are not known before 
deliberations are conducted and completed (Elster 1998; Knight and Johnson1997, 279-319). 
Feminists have argued that situated deliberation leading to democratic outcomes is particularly 
suited to the way women do (or are predisposed to do) politics, when they have spoken of 
‘transversal politics’ (see Yuval-Davis 1997; Cockburn 1999). As this study shows, the 
intersectionality of caste, class, and gender tend to undermine the values of rationality and 
impartiality in the panchayats.  
As outcome deliberative democracy focuses on the educative power of the process of 
deliberation; the community-generating power of the process of public deliberation; the fairness 
of the procedure in such a model; the epistemic or knowledge-building outcome of deliberation 
and the “congruence of the ideal of politics articulated by deliberative democracy with ‘who we 
are’” (Cooke 2002, 53-87; Elster 1998). However, some scholars argue that the deliberative 
model is rather vulnerable as a framework for reaching particular (better) outcomes. For 
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example, Squires suggests that the deliberative framework endorses a “bifurcated model of 
democracy” that separates participation from decision making, “locating deliberation within an 
informal public sphere and decision making in the formal public sphere” (2002, 134). Despite 
some cross-party discussions and support among female members of panchayats, the evidence of 
better policy and project outcomes remains patchy with social hierarchies and party lines 
containing such work.  
Deliberation can only take place in a context that is conducive to open debate, which 
often undermines social hierarchies and poses challenges for both the process of decision making 
and its outcomes. Deliberative democracy advocates have focused on political equality. This has 
provoked considerable skepticism. Susan Stokes names the “pathologies of deliberation” that 
arise as a result: deliberation can produce outcomes that are perverse from the perspective of 
democratic theory, where hegemonic beliefs and information about how a society can and should 
organize themselves make the representatives’ views subject to manipulation. The quality of the 
information representatives need and receive is suspect in the age of monopolistic mass media. 
Moreover, the quality of information varies depending upon the levels of literacy and formal and 
civic education available to the representatives (Stokes 1998, 123-39). Thus deliberative politics 
can provide legitimacy to preferences that are arrived at by a flawed process. This has political 
consequences. Finally, deliberative processes could, because of their legitimizing nature and the 
public nature of the deliberative process, produce political identities that are debilitating for those 
who hold them—shifting of positions over time thus becomes less rather than more possible.  
Skepticism toward deliberative politics focuses our attention upon how and what we need 
to challenge and reform in order to translate political equality into a more socially embedded 
egalitarian politics. Do we need to take into account the force of the dalit (low caste) movement 
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for equality when assessing the processes of deliberations that women engage in the panchayats? 
Do we need to consider whether, given the force of gendered hierarchies in rural areas, the local 
space of the panchayat is the most appropriate space for deliberation, or does deliberation occur 
better at a national level in parliament, where resources are greater, the pressures of particular 
interests not so visibly dominant, and the consequences of one’s political position not so 
immediate (Rai 2000)? Given the role of political parties as aggregators of interests, would 
deliberation thrive better in a nonparty context without which the possibilities of a deliberative 
process shifting agendas are fairly limited, even though political parties do provide support and 
resources (monetary and informational) to its members that would be invaluable in equalizing 
the resources that potential candidates bring to panchayat elections?  
Here, arguments of justice are juxtaposed with those of general interests or the common 
good (Cohen 1989) and we need to consider the “importance of inequalities of power, which 
generate conflicting interests as well imbalances in capacities to participate in a politics based on 
reasoning” (Picciotto 2001). The justice impulse leads us to include marginalized groups in 
deliberation-based decision-making processes and to focus on strategies of capacity enhancement 
of those involved. As context it is argued that the deliberative setting promotes rationality and 
impartiality, and considers the question, who deliberates?  
Focusing on the context of deliberation would also raise the issue of guaranteeing 
religious, moral, and expressive liberties, both for individuals and groups of citizens’ associating 
on the basis of identity-based differences. These fundamental human rights are routinely 
undermined through structures of exclusion, toleration of violence against minorities and the 
marginalized, and in the name of imagined national and cultural characteristics. Finally, it would 
examine issues of capacity enhancement of civic associations that can challenge well-resourced 
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interest lobbyists, as well as the regulation and challenging of information distribution through 
media. This could include, for example, lobbying for less monopolistic media ownership, on the 
one hand, and the tightening of rules for “declaring particular interests” of representatives, on the 
other.  
There is also the issue of political resources—equality and capacity or capability (Knight 
and Johnson 1997, 279-319). As theorists proposing the deliberative framework acknowledge, 
“A commitment to political equality involves potential trade-offs with other societal goals.” 
They concede that “some redistribution of power and relevant material resources as well as an 
acceptance of inequalities in the treatment of citizens by the state” will have to become 
acceptable (310). How does deliberation fare under such conditions of relative or absolute 
inequality? Does the discourse of capacity or capability mediate between political and 
socioeconomic inequality? The issue then is how we ensure conditions of deliberative democracy 
by ensuring the condition of “substantive equality in resources” (Phillips 1995, 154) that will 
build the capacity of representatives to participate, deliberate, and influence the outcome of 
deliberation.  
Political equality of resources would mean procedural (access) and substantive 
(influence) resources at both the agenda-setting and decision-making stages (Dworkin 1987; 
Knight and Johnson 1997). Equality of resources also, therefore, means that individual assent to 
arguments resulting in outcome is uncoerced, and that the capacity to advance persuasive claims 
is supported equally. That all claims are subject to critical scrutiny, and that all participants 
should be able to challenge and defend the positions of themselves and others, and that 
asymmetries of socioeconomic resources should not impede this process. While authority 
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relations, of necessity, cannot be precluded, they are also subject to challenge, and the response 
to this challenge must rely on argument and uncoerced persuasion.  
Regard to political equality of opportunity and resources can require policies that treat 
individuals unequally—setting quotas for example, based on caste, race, ethnicity, and gender. 
This would recognize that particular interests should not be excluded from the deliberative 
process. The politics of presence can be part of the process of deliberation about why certain 
interests have been excluded from being represented and how they might be included. This 
would allow the question of resources to be addressed not through the individual but through 
recognizing the social situatedness of the individual—through “group differentiated citizenship” 
(Kymlicka 1995; Young 1995). Here, difference is seen not as a burden of identity but as a 
resource for “democratic communication among and across various groups, the outcome of 
which is the more comprehensive and effective form of social knowledge” (Bohman and Rehg 
1997, xxv). On this reading of political equality, reasonableness has to be a central norm built 
into deliberative procedures. Interests, however, bind reasonableness. Can bounded 
reasonableness translate into deliberation leading to shifts in policy (outcomes)?  
Those who answer this question in the negative point first to the structures of power 
surrounding the processes of deliberation, which destabilize and even block communication and 
therefore deliberation, and consequently make shifts of political positions either impossible, or 
perfunctory. In the context of the Indian caste system, for example, the route that has led to 
greater influence is caste-based identity politics filtered through a formalized party system—
hardly a deliberative context. Second, critics would point to the risks of public deliberation that 
are differentially experienced by those engaged upon it, leading either to a less-than-honest 
deliberative process or to the playing out of unacceptable risk in the lives of some and not others, 
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rendering political equality impossible. For women joining the panchayats under the quota 
system, the opportunity for leveling off gender inequalities comes at a risk not experienced by 
men of the dominant castes. Their merit and their commitment to their families is questioned; 
they are regarded as pawns in the hands of male relatives and, at the same time, are said to be 
undermining the family by working in such a male-dominated political arena.  
Those who answer the above question in the affirmative argue that entering the political 
process through an “unrestricted domain” would lead to an understanding of others’ positions, 
and possible trust in the process itself; reasonableness thus becomes part of the outcome. 
Deliberative processes need to be grounded in substantive equality that will ensure “that each 
individual citizens will have the personal resources to participate effectively in that process”—
procedurally through ensuring the minimizing of both “promises” (individual and collective 
bribes) and threats, and substantively through ensuring the enhancement of capacities of the 
representatives (Knight and Johnson 1997, 293).  
Sen has distinguished between the “means of freedom” and the “extent of freedom” both 
of which affect the ways individuals engage in the deliberative process and even use the political 
goods available to them most effectively and in their interest (1992, 8). Focusing on capacities 
highlights the fundamental importance of effective freedom, which is “the capacity to live as one 
would choose; it is the capacity for social agency [and the] effective use of public freedoms” 
(Bohman 1996a, 130). Within Sen’s framework, the major politically relevant capacities are (1) 
the capacity to formulate authentic preferences, where authenticity denotes the interpretative 
freedom of representatives; (2) effective use of cultural resources, the capacity to be able to use 
hegemonic political language and concepts creatively, critically and subversively; and (3) 
cognitive capacities that require acquiring the information necessary to diminish uncertainty (Sen 
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1992, 148-49). I argue below that the quota based participation of women in panchayats, while 
not reflecting all these indicators of effective freedom, do show a shift in social hierarchies and 
the power relations underpinning them.  
 
Challenges of Participatory Politics 
After passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments, high expectations were attached to the 
panchayats as spaces of local decision making. According to a pancha from the southern state of 
Andhra Pradesh, 
There are so many unrealistic expectations generated by the propaganda in the 
media without panchayats having enough resources. . . . They have made the 
panchayat disabled. Agendas are set not by us but by central or provincial 
government. We don’t have resources, only MLAs (Members of [Provincial] 
Legislative Assemblies) do. We can only propose [schemes]. We have a lot of 
schemes but don’t set the priorities. Block level governments do that. We only 
have to implement their projects. (Interview, April 25, 2003)  
The question we could ask here is whether this sense of powerlessness in setting agendas can 
influence deliberative processes, or whether any decision-making process is open to deliberative 
politics? Do unrealistic expectations set up the panchayats to fail and does this undermine the 
processes through which decisions are arrived?<4>  
Similar extraordinarily high expectations of good governance delivery have been placed 
on women as compared to male politicians. As a sarpanch from Uttranchal commented, 
“Women have more capacity for work than men. They are conscious of what others will say. We 
have to take these things into account when we work” (Interview, April 25, 2002). These 
Comment [HLM11]: If all interviews 
are from the same date/time, we should 
probably just say so in a note and not have 
all the parenthetical citations, which seem 
like a bit of overkill. Or, do you have 
pseudonyms or can we use a alphabetizing. 
See also my query below about dates. 
Comment [ARR12]: The interviews are 
not all from the same date/time 
Comment [HLM13]: I’m a bit confused 
by the fact that these interview dates are all 
in April on the same date but different 
years. Can you explain?  
Comment [ARR14]: The reason for this 
is that I interviewed various women 
panchas from all parts of the country in 
New Delhi where they meet every year 
from 24 April to 27th to celebrate the 
passing of the quota bill.  
 13 
expectations often become a burden on women as they struggle to cope with a host of political 
and social agendas with minimal resources, training, or support of governmental agencies, a 
complex and multilateral network of privilege and exclusion and with varying familial backing. 
Speaking of her first day as a panch, one woman said, “I was so worried. This was the first time I 
had worked outside the home. I didn’t want to be a panchayat member, but my husband insisted” 
(Interview, April 25, 2002). However, the sarpanch was more confident: “I had no trouble to 
work as sarpanch. My purpose in becoming a sarpanch is not to earn money or influence but to 
do service. You will always face opposition if you work honestly—as a woman but also as a 
sarpanch because they can’t buy me. Women in the panchayat have always supported me, but 
some men cannot accept me as a sarpanch” (Interview, April 25, 2002).  
A particular complaint about the membership of panchayats was that of remuneration for 
time and work. Several women pointed out that without a salary the panchayat is more open to 
corrupt practices and to being dominated by upper-class individuals who can afford not to be 
paid : “We should at least be paid expenses,” one said. The issue of payment is a particular one 
for women. Being paid is important also because it gives maan<5> within the family” 
(Interview, April 25, 2002). In terms of process, then, the induction of women into politics 
requires attention to expectations of members, their training as well as remuneration issues. One 
could argue that such attention leads to improved outcomes in decision making as women are 
better supported both within and outside the family and that adequate resourcing of their 
participation allows them to insist upon honest, noncorrupt decisions. However, the gendered 
contexts both within and outside the home make these issues contentious and complex.  
Women’s representation privileges their particular gender identity. Whatever their caste 
or class, women are expected to be more compliant. A woman sarpanch from Uttranchal 
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suggested that panchayat members found her confidence difficult to deal with and one of the 
more influential male members refused to attend meetings of the panchayats in protest against 
what was termed her intractable style of functioning (Interview, April 25, 2002). Gendered 
assumptions about women’s lack of education and learning are abused by government 
functionaries who refuse to give them access to records or even willfully misdirect them about 
conduct of meetings (Mayaram and Pal 1996, 18).  
At the same time, however, women from lower castes are often treated with contempt by 
upper-caste panchayat members (as are men, but there the gender inequality does not add to the 
exclusion) (Sharma 2000, 7). Nirmala Buch’s study shows that “14% of the women 
representatives came from landless families, 19.5% from families with marginal holdings and 
20.6% from families with small holdings . . . [O]ver all, 32% used hired labour and 22% worked 
as hired labour” (2000, 15). While there is a considerable presence of poor farmers and 
agricultural laborers, Buch also points out that the sarpanch of panchayats are of higher-class 
position as indicated by the fact that while “families of 14.8% representative have [scooters and 
motorcycles] among chairpersons their percentage is 35%” (Buch 2000). That the women 
involved in panchayat politics are aware of the privilege of class was evident in my interview 
with a sarpanch: “Poor women cannot participate in politics,” she said. “It is just not practical. 
We are not paid for our work. Also a capable pradhan (sarpanch) needs to travel. A poor 
woman, if she is honest, cannot even travel. The panchayat members and the pradhan should be 
paid if they are not to become corrupt. How can a poor person support herself without being 
paid? Corruption undermines the work of a panchayat. My husband has supported this 
expenditure [on traveling around the village on a scooter] because ours is a religious and social 
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service family, but there are limits” (April 24, 2004). Caste lines, however, strongly offset class 
privilege.  
Though one-third of all women elected on quotas are from the lower castes, it is 
impossible to draw a straightforward correlation between their (low) caste position and the 
support they get from their families. Interviews with panchayat members suggested that lower-
caste women tend to get strong support from their husbands, brothers, and fathers. Their 
presence in panchayats is a political resource for the family. The experience of women 
representatives in panchayats shows that the educative and community-building power of the 
processes of deliberation occurs in some cases at an individual level and in others at a collective 
level, depending on the length of support that representatives receive from their families and 
other agencies such as NGOs (see Rai 2002). The existing levels of economic standing and 
education are also not necessarily reflected in the way women representatives are able to 
participate in panchayat work: “While a woman panchayat member from an upper caste 
background resigned herself to her husband’s diktat in panchayat matters, another illiterate 
women from backward caste performed remarkably well” (Buch 2000, 13; see also Rai et al. 
2006). This evidence seems to support Cooke’s analysis that the educative elements, while in 
some context important side effects of public deliberation, do not themselves provide a 
justification for deliberation (2002).  
In her study of women’s presence in panchayats, Buch found that “in the case of women 
informal source of information like family members and neighbours were prominent as the 
source of information. In the case of male members, panchayat office bearers, government 
officials and media figured relatively more prominently” (2000, 16). This was confirmed by 
panchayat women members I interviewed who suggested that training programs fall short of the 
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challenges they face in the field, that sessions are organized without consulting women on their 
needs, and that trainers often deliver information in a manner that is rather alienating. Indeed, 
they have found the annual meeting of women panchayat members and leaders that are held over 
four days in Delhi much more useful and supportive. Others confirmed that they “train” through 
the support of the sarpanch and the more experienced women panchas in their panchayats: “I 
have had no formal training. Our pradhanji (sarpanch) is wonderful; she is so supportive. The 
previous pradhan, who was also a woman, was not so communicative. This one explains 
everything to us and is transparent is what she does” (Interview, April 25, 2004).  
While participation through conversing and listening and through persuasion is at the 
heart of the deliberative process, it does not mean, of course, that the other major democratic 
processes of voting and bargaining do not occur in a deliberative situation. However, the focus 
remains firmly on arriving at a decision that emerges from discussion, argument, and 
conversation. Women representatives in panchayats have used various strategies for carrying 
their views in the meetings. The first has been to address the issues of proxy male membership of 
panchayats. Living in contexts where women’s participation in public service is tolerated but not 
encouraged, women have had to insist upon attending panchayat meetings and speaking in their 
own voice. This has not been easy. While a sarpanch for Andhra Pradesh proudly declared, “We 
have ensured that men cannot work for women; we have stopped men from attending panchayat 
meetings for their wives,” another panch suggested that male panchas cannot easily accept 
women as colleagues and find it even more difficult to work under women sarpanchas: “When it 
is a strong woman sarpanch men don’t like it and always cast aspersions on her reputation” 
(Interviews, April 25, 2002). Women generally need the support of the men in their lives if their 
participation in politics is to be sustainable.  
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Evidence of male support of women’s participation in panchayat politics is mixed. For 
example, there are some shifts in the way housework is being divided to accommodate new 
demands on the woman’s time; however, women often experience an increased workload. “I get 
up at 4 a.m., cook the two meals, get the children ready for school, and pack lunch for my 
husband. After he goes, I clean the house so that he doesn’t come back to an untidy home. Only 
then do I start my panchayat work. A woman, whatever she does, is really the one who has to 
look after the home,” said a woman panch from Uttranchal (Interview, April 24, 2004).  
Women panchas strategize for political space by taking other women members into 
confidence, through informal discussions, and accepting the help of their families and husbands. 
Some have found that formalities of political power help give them the status that is important 
for acceptance as a public servant. As a panchayat member said to me, “I prefer the meetings to 
take place in the panchayat ghar (house) rather than the sarpancha’s home; it gives you more 
freedom to say what you want; you don’t have to feel obliged” (April 25, 2004). Of course, those 
best able to cope with and even thrive in the political context of local government are those who 
were politically active before joining the panchayat. As the sarpanch recounted: “My family was 
a social-service family. My family always supported me. Together with my father, I participated 
in the andolan (movement) for the creation of Uttarkhand and now I belong to the Uttarkhand 
Kranti Dal party. We suffered such atyachar (oppression) on the 30 September 1994—so many 
men were beaten badly and women were raped. I was determined to be part of the new state and 
do service for our people” (April 25, 2004).  
In 2000, I interviewed a woman sarpanch from a lower-caste/class background who said 
that she wished the women panchas could take their children to the meetings with them. I 
assumed that this was a complaint about the lack of child care available in her absence. “Oh no,” 
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she said, “my mother-in-law is happy to look after the children. No, the men behave very 
differently toward us when children are present. They want to set a good example to the children. 
They don’t shout us down or speak rudely when children are present.” Reflecting on the 
transcript of that interview, I learned that civility is an important part of deliberation and that the 
participation of different actors does affect the nature of participation within institutions. In the 
context of the PRIs, participation influences attitudes both of and toward women. Buch’s study 
showed that “48% . . . have reported change in their attitudes—the highest among ST [Scheduled 
Tribes] and SC [Scheduled Caste] women” (2000, 22). Women members of the panchayats have 
also reported “new recognition and respect from their families and communities. . . . It is a 
matter of pride for dalit (low caste) women when upper caste men come to her with requests” 
(Sharma 2000, 13). Buch reports that more than “70% see the change in their status in the family, 
among neighbours, and among own caste persons, and more than 60% see it in govt. offices and 
other caste persons” (2000, 24).  
The PRI system is a political party system. As such, we need to consider how far 
participation can be deliberative in the sense of “shifting” political party positions in the face of 
persuasive argument. Within liberal political theory, political parties are aggregative bodies that 
represent the interests of their members as well as attempt to secure these through gaining 
political recognition in government. However, for women, political parties have posed problems 
of autonomy versus integration, marginalization versus cooptation, and, fundamentally, of 
cooperation versus competition. Political parties have historically been gendered institutions 
where women have found only insecure and marginal hold. While imposing party discipline, 
even institutionally weak political parties have often denied women an autonomous space to 
work toward feminist goals or to develop strategies for addressing gendered social inequalities. 
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In terms of PRIs, we find that the politics of presence has preceded the “politics of ideas”—
political parties are nominating women to panchayat elections, but they do not necessarily reflect 
the ideas of gender equality within the organizations themselves. As a panchayat pradhan (or 
sarpanch, that is, chairperson) from Andhra Pradesh in southern India commented: “The local 
leadership of the party began to interfere with my functions and insisted that I should 
accommodate their interests, even if it comes to violation of rules. . . . [They] held local party 
meetings without my knowledge and shared the funds coming from different sources among 
themselves” (Manikyamba 2000, 4).  
Some evidence exists of cross-party work among women in the panchayats on specific 
issues. One pancha said, “Panchayat members don’t think of themselves as party members” 
(April 25, 2004). However, competition between parties tended to disrupt this cooperation. As, a 
sarpanch explained, “MLAs [Members of Legislative Assemblies] favor their own parties. . . . 
Once we [the panchayats] have the money [for particular projects] party divisions don’t operate, 
but to get money from state governments is dependent upon party politics” (April 25, 2004). 
More research is needed on the role of political parties and how women’s membership of these 
institutions might affect their work within the panchayats. Such research might also shed further 
light on the relationship between the politics of ideas and politics of presence that Phillips has 
explored.  
 
Deliberation as Process and Outcome  
The panchayat quota strategy was adopted as a means to compensate women for their 
historically and culturally bounded exclusion from public political life. Others, following Fraser, 
argued that redistribution of resources, which underpin exclusion of presence and voice, couldn’t 
 20 
be addressed simply through increasing women’s presence in politics. However, Young has 
argued that in the very process of arguing for the recognition of hitherto excluded or 
marginalized groups, there is redistribution of discursive power taking place (1997). The politics 
of recognition and redistribution therefore unfolds simultaneously. Attempting to bring these two 
views together Phillips has argued that it is “in the relationship between ideas and presence that 
we can best hope to find a fairer system of representation, not in a false opposition between one 
or the other” (1995, 25). In this context of the disjuncture between the politics of presence and 
the politics of ideas, deliberative politics becomes an attractive framework within which to 
analyze political spaces and resources available to women within PRIs, and to assess whether 
such a framework would enhance these. It is, of course, easy to be skeptical of the functioning of 
panchayats. Social and gendered inequalities persist to undermine the quality of its deliberations 
and the outcome of its decisions. Quotas for women have not led to changes in women’s status 
within the home, and neither have political parties or governments increased the seats for women 
to a parity level. One could even argue that women are now carrying a triple burden—working 
within the home, as farmers and laborers in many cases, and then as panchas. Skepticism of 
deliberative processes is also common. Alternatively, the levels of self-confidence and 
aspirations expressed by women who have been participating in PRI politics are on the increase 
(Buch 2000). This increase is in the context of a patriarchal society where quotas were initially 
seen as undermining the merit-based representation within institutions. While the context of 
poverty means that poor women and men do not often feel able to hold the office of the 
sarpanch, their participation as members of the panchayats increases the confidence that is 
needed to raise issues of such constraints to participation.  
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Despite all its problems, if deliberative communication is a viable future means of 
enhancing participatory politics and shifting policy as outcome through a process where different 
procedural mechanisms ensure the presence of groups hitherto excluded, then we can also begin 
to assess how the inclusion of women (as individuals and as part of a group) in PRIs could 
influence other levels of politics. Would, as is beginning to happen, women in rural India insist 
upon the redistribution of land, reviving questions of mobilization for better working conditions 
and access to social and financial resources (Karat 2005)? This could require a focus on an 
“empowered citizenry” within strengthened institutional frameworks for which procedural 
measures, such as the power of veto, “threshold representation,” and “weighted control over 
agenda-setting,” might be considered. What deliberative processes based on political 
redistribution of resources should allow for is a combination of recognition (of difference 
through quotas) as well as redistribution (through enhancing capabilities as part of the equation 
of deliberation, procedural mechanisms, and information exchange) to empower representatives 
to influence policy outcomes as well as change the nature of the debates themselves (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 3). Finally, would deliberative politics allow representatives to go beyond the 
group identities with which they started—especially in the context of quotas based on 
recognition of historical exclusions of groups—to become “empowered citizens” through the 
process of deliberation, through “rooting” as well as “shifting” their “original positions”?  
Phillips reminds us of the 1970s debates that distinguished between inequality based on 
the terms of distribution and inequality based on the terms of production, “The former dealing in 
quantifiable levels of income and wealth, the latter in the power relations that expose workers to 
the commands of employers, subject them to exploitation, and alienate them from the very labour 
that could be giving meaning to their lives” (1999, 16). She argues that today few would expect 
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to eliminate (as opposed to ameliorate) structural inequalities embedded in production regimes of 
capitalism, and she suggests that the focus of debate be on inequality of distribution (17). Only in 
this context, can the issue of capacity enhancement be linked directly to that of redistribution of 
resources. This might lead to tradeoffs with other societal goals, which would entail 
redistribution of power and material resources as well as acceptance of inequality in treatment of 
groups and individual by the state (Knight and Johnson 1997, 310). Negotiations with and 
challenges to the state then become an important part of the deliberative strategy if democratic 
politics is to thrive and political actors are to exercise agency. David Marquand, for example, has 
argued that only an empowered and active citizenry can progress toward social equality (in 
Phillips 1999, 15). The two aspects need to be held together, sometimes in tension, to understand 
the nature of change through institutional politics. Despite the slow process of change at local 
levels of governance in India, women’s increased participation in panchayats is an important part 
of creating an active citizenry that includes both men and women and challenges the dominant 
relations of social power.  
 
Notes 
I am grateful to Pratiksha Baxi, Upendra Baxi, Catherine Hoskyns, Jeremy Roche, Fabienne 
Peter, Georgina Waylen, and the editors of this issue and reviewers of the article for incisive 
comments on this essay. The shortcomings are, of course, all mine. 
1. While this essay focuses on the state-based panchayats, also of importance are caste 
panchayats, which are not state authorized and which regulate social relations within the village 
and can act as “instruments of terror” (Karat 2004) in regulating sexualities. See also Baxi, Rai 
and Ali 2003. 
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2. The administrative structure of the Panchayati Raj system encompasses village or 
gram panchayats covering 56,500 villages (93 percent of the total), block samitis (councils) with 
53.3 village panchayats per samiti, zila parishad with 13.4 samitis per zila parishad. There are 
some variations in this structure in different parts of the country (Kaushik 1993, 20-21).  
3. In 2000, there were 532 district panchayats, 5,912 block or tauluk panchayats and 
231,630 village or gram panchayats and there are more than three million elected panchayati raj 
representatives of whom women constitute a third (Ford Foundation 2002, 14-15) 
4. Buch has identified four such myths (2000, 11): (1) women’s passivity and lack of 
interest in political institutions; (2) only the well-to-do women of the upper strata will come 
through reservation; (3) their political connectivity—only privileged kinswomen of powerful 
politicians will enter these institutions to keep the seats for them; and (4) women who have 
entered the panchayats are only proxy and namesake members. They do not participate in 
panchayats. 
5. Maan denotes respect, though this might be underpinned by pride. A woman’s status 
might be enhanced if she has an income, where the job can be characterized as “public service.” 
This also supports Amartya Sen’s contention that paid work outside the home is a prerequisite 
for women’s improved status within the family.  
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